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THE PILL AND THE CODE
Martin A. Frey*
Ten million women in the United States take birth con-
trol pills. Of those taking the pill, one in 66,000 under 35 and
one in 25,000 over 35 will die each year from abnormal blood
clotting. The rate is almost eight times that for those not on
the pill.' The risk of fatal heart attacks for women between
30 and 39 is three times higher for those who take the pill
than for those who do not. For women over 40, the risk is five
times higher. 2 These are only the fatalities. This does not
include those who suffer permanent physical injury.
Strokes and heart attacks comprise only one facet of the
pill problem. Because oral contraceptives are not 100% effec-
tive, there exists the added risk of unwanted pregnancies.
Oral contraceptives also may cause chromosome damage in
the consumer which, in turn, may lead to deformed off-
spring.
* Professor of Law, College of Law, The University of Tulsa; Member, Mis-
souri Bar; B.S.M.E. Northwestern University (1962); J.D. Washington University
(1965): LL.M. George Washington University (1966). I would like to thank Ronald
Alley, Phyllis H. Frey, Richard W. Maxwell, Carolyn Cloud, J.K. Pedro, and Becky
Brown for their assistance. The research for this article was supported in part by
funds from the Legal Research Center, Texas Tech University.
Parke, Davis & Co., What You Should Know about "the Pill," February 1973
(prepared by the American Medical Association in cooperation with the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association and the Food and Drug Administration, and reprinted by the various
pharmaceutical companies and given to physicians for distribution to their pa-
tients) [hereinafter cited as What You Should Know about "the Pill"]. For a
discussion of the history of the pill, see Barrett, Product Liability and the Pill, 19
CiEV. ST. L. REv. 468 (1970); Liability of Birth Control Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS
l.,. 1526 (1972).
NEWSWEEK. Sept. 8, 1975, at 77.
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I. PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE CONSUMER
Suppose a woman, after taking oral contraceptives, suf-
fers a stroke, heart attack or other physical side effect. Does
the Uniform Commercial Code provide her with a remedy for
her physical injury? The Code includes two implied warran-
ties. Section 2-314 defines an implied warranty of merchant-
ability as follows:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a war-
ranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a con-
tract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used; . ...
Section 2-315 defines an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select
or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose.
Damages for breach of either warranty is not limited to
property injury. Section 2-715(2)(b) extends damages to per-
sonal injuries as well:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include
(b) injury to person or property proximately result-
ing from any breach of warranty.
Although the Code provides for personal injury damages
for breach of an implied warranty, the injured consumer's
path to recovery is not clear. Seven major obstacles exist: (1)
whether the transaction is within the scope of article 2 of the
Code so that the warranties are applicable; (2) whether the
Code's longer statute of limitations is available; (3) whether
the injured consumer is required to comply with the Code's
notice requirement; (4) whether the injured consumer must
be in both vertical and horizontal privity with the defendant
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pharmaceutical company; (5) whether the claim states a
breach of a Code warranty; (6) whether the warranties have
been disclaimed; and (7) whether contributory negligence or
assumption of risk bar the action.3
A. Scope
Section 2-102 of the Code defines the scope of article 2:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to
transactions in goods ....
If, for example, Ms. Jones is given a free sample of oral
contraceptives by her physician and these pills cause a
stroke, has she forfeited any possible Code warranty because
the "transaction" (her receipt of the pills) was a gift from her
physician and not a purchase? If Ms. Smith pays a nominal
amount or makes a donation to Planned Parenthood or some
other non-profit agency for her examination, prescription,
and pills and then suffers a heart attack after taking her pills
has she forfeited the Code warranties by receiving "services"
along with the "goods"? In both cases, the scope of article 2
determines whether the warranties are available.
1. Free samples
At first reading, the term "transactions" in section 2-102
appears to include the broad spectrum of sales, leases and
gifts. The term "transactions," however, is misleading. It is
seldom used again in article 2;1 "sale" is the term used more
frequently. Even the short title for article 2 is "sales," not
"transactions.' 
5
:1 Other problems exist as well. For example, what law should be applied?
Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449 (D.R.I. 1971)(federal court jurisdic-
tion based on diversity of citizenship with plaintiffs domiciliaries of Rhode Island,
defendant a foreign corporation, and the birth control pills at issue manufactured
in a state other than Rhode Island). Is the state's long-arm statute available? Ratliff
%. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 44 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948,
rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972) (non-birth control drug neither manufac-
tured nor consumed in the state).
' The term "transaction" is used in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-104(1),
(3) [hereinafter cited as UCCj.
UCC § 2-101.
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The phrase prefacing the statement of scope ("Unless
the extent otherwise requires") conveys the full limitation
placed on the term "transactions." Most article 2 sections
require otherwise. Most are expressed in terms of "contract
for sale" or "buyer" or "seller." ' The language of 2-314 (im-
plied warranty of merchantability) and 2-315 (implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose) is no different. Sec-
tion 2-314 uses the words "contract for their sale" and
"seller," and section 2-315 uses "seller," "contracting" and
"buyer." There can be little doubt that these warranties
arise only in transactions that are sales.7
Wheit is a sale? "[T]he passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price. . ." differentiates a sale from a non-
sale.' Whether a transaction is a sale or not has profound
significance when the pharmaceutical company gives free
oral contraceptive samples to physicians who pass them on
to patients. This is precisely the way Ms. Allen, in Allen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,' obtained her oral contracep-
tives. Nine days after taking her first free pill, she was hospi-
talized with a blood clot. When she brought an action
against the pharmaceutical company for breach of a Code
warranty (2-315), the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Texas readily granted the pharmaceutical com-
" " 'Contract for sale' includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to
sell goods at a future time." UCC §2-106(1). "'Buyer' means a person who buys or
contracts to buy goods." UCC §2-103(1)(a). " 'Seller' means a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods." UCC § 2-103(1)(d).
7 Some cases have expanded the scope of article 2 to cover leases. Compare
Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. U-Vend, Inc., 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974), Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974), and
Smith v. Sharpensteen, 13 UCC REP. SERV. 609 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973), with Mays
v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 208 S.E.2d 614 (1974), Bona v.
Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972), and Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Starline Overseas Corp., 346 N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. T. 1973). See Hawkland, The
Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.
FORwMt 446, 459; Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform
('ommercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1971). This expansion, while not within
the literal meaning of "sale," is consistent with the concept of bargained-for ex-
change (implied warranties for price). The free sample cases which are gifts do not
include an exchange (the price paid) for the pills.
UCC § 2-106(1).
" 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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pany's motion for summary judgment on the ground that it
did not receive payment and therefore the transaction was
not a sale and could not support the warranty action. The
plaintiff attempted to characterize her situation as a
" 'transaction in goods' . . . based on the expectation of
future profits. . . ." The court responded in traditional
common-law contracts language. Was there consideration
for the pharmaceutical company's performance (giving the
samples)? If consideration were present, it would have been
in the form of a promise from the plaintiff or her physician.
There was no promise of future sales, although this may have
been the motive for dispensing the samples. Without a prom-
ise, there could be neither a benefit to the pharmaceutical
company (the only benefit would be fortuitous, if any) nor a
detriment to the injured consumer. Thus, there was no con-
sideration for the pharmaceutical company's perform-
ance-dispensing the samples. Without consideration there
could be no contract. The court refused to extend article 2
warranties beyond those transactions where there is an ex-
change: the warranties for the price.
While public policy requires that the injured consumer
be provided a remedy for damages caused by the manufac-
turer, regardless of the circumstances under which she re-
ceived the drug, she must look to the law of torts rather than
the law of commercial transactions. The risk is clear. Free
samples will place the injured consumer beyond the scope of
the article 2 warranties.
2. Sale of goods or services
The scope of article 2 is limited to transactions in goods
(2-102). Both the 2-314 and 2-315 warranties call for a sale
of goods rather than a sale of services. The goods-service
distinction (often referred to as the sale-service distinction)
is important when the consumer deals with a clinic that both
prescribes and sells oral contraceptives. The question be-
comes: has the clinic freed itself from the Code warranties
by performing a service as well as making a sale of goods?
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.' ° considered this issue. Berry was
o 56 II. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
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a warranty action against both Searle, the manufacturer of
Enovid, and the Planned Parenthood Association of Chi-
cago, the agency that prescribed and sold Enovid to Ms.
Berry. Planned Parenthood argued that the Code's warran-
ties applied only to transactions that were predominantly
sales of goods. It claimed to be primarily a service organiza-
tion which maintained a staff of physicians to give birth-
control advice. It maintained that the dispensation of birth-
control pills was only an ancillary function. In deciding the
Berry case, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital," a case involv-
ing an action for strict liability in tort against a hospital for
supplying contaminated blood to a patient as part of the
hospital's ancillary services. The Cunningham court had
held that "to assert that the transfusion of whole blood by a
hospital into a patient, for which a charge is made, does not
give rise to implied warranties because no 'sale' is involved,
is in our judgment simply unrealistic." The Berry court, in
rejecting Planned Parenthood's argument, said "The same
conclusion is appropriate in this case."
Illinois may be unique in permitting a breach of Code
warranty action to be brought against a hospital or clinic
that dispenses oral contraceptives along with advice and pre-
scriptions. Most states support the position that supplying
blood to a patient by a hospital is not a sale of goods but a
service. 2 The same holding should apply to the supply of
pharmaceutical items since only the commodity has
changed.
" 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
,2 McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972) (Ten-
nessee); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hospital, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1973); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 157 S.E.2d 923 (1967);
Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 637 (Md. Sup. Ct. 1971);
Florulli v. Schrag, 14 UCC REP. SERV. 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Hoffman v. Miseri-
cordia Hospital, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970) (non-code warranties applicable);
cf. Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (pace-
maker); Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)
(surgical pin); contra, Schmaltz v. St. Luke's Hospital, 33 Colo. App. 351, 521 P.2d
787 (1974). Many of these decisions were based on state Code variations. Rostocki
v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973), illustrates the effect
of a statutory variation.
[Vol. 15
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B. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations may bar the injured con-
sumer's path should she delay in seeking redress. The Code
(2-725(1)) imposes a four-year limitations period.
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has ac-
crued. .... . 1
Can the injured consumer rely on this four-year period or
does the two-year tort statute apply? Judicial response is by
no means uniform. Some courts take the position that the
nature of the cause of action is determined by the predomi-
nant characteristic of the action and not by the form in
which the action was brought. Since the predominant char-
acteristic of the warranty action is products liability, an area
of tort law, the action is characterized as sounding in tort,
and the Code's four-year statue of limitations is therefore
inapplicable."
Another group of courts holds that it does not matter
whether the action would be characterized at common law
as tort or contract. What is important is that the Code, by
its warranty provisions (2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-318) and by its
damages provisions (2-714, 2-715), creates a statutory action
with a strict liability design. This recognizes the existence of
two separate causes of action: strict liability in tort, and
implied warranty provided by the Uniform Commercial
Code.' ,
UCC § 2-725(1). Some states have increased the limitations period: Missis-
sippi (6 years), Oklahoma (5 years), South Carolina (6 years), Wisconsin (6 years).
11 Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1361-62 (Okla. 1974) (au-
tomobile collision) is typical. Prior to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Kirkland, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 13 UCC
REP. S Rv. 6 (10th Cir. 1973), a birth control pill case, held the Code's statute of
limitations was controlling. When Kirkland was decided, the Tenth Circuit with-
drew its previous opinion and held that the warranty action was barred by the two-
year statute of limitations. Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1974).
The dissent in Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776,
781 (1973)(birth control pills), strenuously argued for one cause of action and the
shorter limitations period.
", Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Redfield
v. Mead. Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973). Under this view, each
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For a statutory action, the Code provides a specific limi-
tation period (2-725(1)) and courts need not look outside the
Code." Some courts, however, have developed legislative in-
tent arguments to justify using the Code's limitation period.
The applicability of each argument depends on the statutory
structure within the state.
Oregon statutes for example, provide a general two-year
statute of limitations:
Actions at law shall only be commenced within the periods
prescribed by this chapter, after the cause of action shall have
accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by stat-
ute . . . . '1
The Oregon Supreme Court, in Redfield v. Mead, Johnson
& Co.,'" found that the Code's four-year statue of limitations
was such "a different limitation . . . prescribed by statute."
The court said:
When the [two] statutory provisions are read together, the legis-
lative intent is clear. The legislature has provided a cause of
action for personal injuries for breach of warranty [2-314, 2-315,
2-714, 2-715(2)(b)] and has adopted a limitation period made
specifically applicable to such actions. The action for breach of
cause of action has its own attributes. For example, tort liability cannot be limited
by exclusion of warranties as is possible under 2-316 or expanded by express warran-
ties as is possible under 2-313.
Confusion between the two causes of action can be traced to their historical
evolution. ,Judge Denecke, in his specially concurring opinion in Redfield v. Mead,
Johnson & Co., supra had this impression of the historical development of the Code
warranties:
Courts extend the basis for liability in products liability cases beyond
negligence. In making the extension they borrowed the concept and ter-
minology of "implied warranty" from the law of sales in order to keep
within known legal remedies. . . . This, however, created new problems
because implied warranty in the law of sales had some impediments
which were regarded as ill-suited to a remedy for personal injuries. The
requirement of privity and the necessity of notice of breach were two such
impediments. The courts eventually freed the remedy of these contrac-
tual incidents by evolving the tort of strict liability. ...
At the same time that the tort of strict liability was evolving from the con-
tractual remedy of implied warranty, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
were slightly enlarging the implied warranty remedy for personal injuries.
6 Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.010 (1973).
16 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973).
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warranty is clearly one for which "a different limitation is pre-
scribed by statute". . . and thus is not governed by the provi-
sions of [the general statute of limitations].
Not all states have a general statute of limitations with
the convenient phrase "except where a different limitation
is prescribed by statute." Illinois, for example, has a general
statute of limitations which reads:
Actions for damages for an injury to the person. . . shall be
commenced within two years next after the cause of action ac-
crued.2"
Prior to the adoption of the Code in 1961, Illinois applied this
general two-year statue of limitations to all personal injury
actions regardless of whether the form of the action was tort
or implied warranty. With the adoption of the Code, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co." l said
that it was no longer sufficient to examine only the general
statue of limitations, but that the entire statutory scheme
now must be considered. The court held that sections 2-315,
2-318, 2-715(2)(b), 2-719(3), and 2-725(1) clearly demon-
strated the legislative intent to create a statutory cause of
action for breach of implied warranty to afford consumer
protection to those who sustain personal injuries resulting
from product deficiencies. This remedy was distinct from,
and in addition to, that existing in strict tort liability. Each
remedy, therefore, had its own statute of limitations.
While the availability of the Code's statute of limita-
tions carries with it the advantage of a longer limitations
period, it carries disadvantages as well. One undesirable fea-
ture involves the calculation of when the cause of action will
accrue. The injured consumer's cause of action for breach of
a Code warranty will ordinarily accrue when the seller tend-
ers delivery of the goods. Section 2-725(2) provides:
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, re-
gardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach.
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is
made. . ..
Id. at 274-75, 512 P.2d at 777-78.
kIi. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §15 (1966).
2 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
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The Code's limitation statute in some cases could result
in barring a plaintiff's cause of action before any injury has
occurred. Some tempering of result exists in those jurisdic-
tions which recognize the theory of strict liability in tort as
formulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
With this theory available, a plaintiff who is injured more
than four years after the sale of the defective product, al-
though barred from recovery in a breach of warranty action
pursuant to the Code, will nevertheless have two years to
bring an action based on strict tort liability, provided she
can show that the defective product was unreasonably dan-
gerous as required under 402A.
22
If a court recognizes the co-existence of causes of action
arising from the same facts and based on strict tort liability
and the UCC, it becomes important that plaintiffs plead-
ings are framed in Code terms rather than in the terms of
traditional strict tort liability. 23
C. Notice of the Breach
Is notice of the alleged breach an essential element of
the plaintiffs case? The Code expressly calls for notice of the
breach of warranty in section 2-607(3)(a):
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy;...
While the Code states that notice is required, courts are in
disagreement about whether lack of notice is detrimental to
the plaintiffs cause of action. New York carved a group of
cases from the Code's notice requirement. Those cases held
that 2-607 did not apply in situations involving goods sold for
human consumption. The New York courts held that the
reason for the notice rule had no relevant application to the
'2 Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776, 778-79 (1973).
'2 Cf. Id. at 275, 512 P.2d at 778. To compute the running of the statute of
limitations, exclude the first day and include the last. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
56 111. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974) (the inclusion of the last day saved the injured
consumer from being barred). For a discussion of when the statute of limitations
begins to run, see Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex.
1974).
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circumstances of a case involving goods sold for human
consumption. That section apparently has to do with the
sales of goods whose inspection or use discloses a defect of
quality, lack of conformance to sample, failure to comply
with description, or other cognate circumstances, which
causes money damage to the vendee. To require a complaint
which, whatever its nomenclature of form, is really grounded
on tortious elements, to indicate a notice of rejection or claim
of damage within a reasonable time on account of defect of
edible goods in a retail transaction, would strain the rule
beyond a breaking point of sense or proportion to its in-
tended object.24
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument of
the inapplicability of notice to goods sold for human con-
sumption.25 The court tied its interpretation of 2-607 to 2-
725. A statute of limitations, it reasoned, is designed to af-
ford an opportunity to prepare a defense. The acceptance of
2-725(1) as the appropriate limitation period for actions in-
volving personal injuries predicated on Code liability sub-
stantially extends the filing period for such actions beyond
the traditional two-year limitation period. The court be-
lieved that the notification prodecure was therefore proper if
such theory of liability was advanced. The court reasoned
that to hold otherwise might permit a defendant to be con-
fronted with stale claims, thereby preventing the marshaling
of evidence for a defense. It would also foster a selective
disregard of various requirements set forth in the Code based
solely upon the nature of the action. If the Code is the basis
of recovery, a plaintiff will not be permitted to fulfill only
certain requirements while ignoring others, the Illinois court
said. The plaintiff who benefits from the longer statute of
limitations should be obliged to provide notice of the alleged
breach within a reasonable time after discovery.2"
2 Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 App. Div. 2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d
257, 259 (1973), quoting Kennedy v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200
N.Y.S. 121, 122 (1923). In Fischer the time between the cause of action and notice
was at least 3 years.
2 Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 11. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
" See Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973)
(notice essential to plaintiff's case).
1976-77]
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D. Privity of Contract
Privity of contract is the time-honored phrase describing
the relationship between contracting parties. When a war-
ranty is breached, the buyer may sue his or her immediate
seller: they are in "privity." May the buyer also proceed up
the marketing chain and sue the manufacturer of the goods?
If "vertical privity" is required, the buyer cannot sue beyond
his or her immediate seller.
"Horizontal privity" does not contemplate climbing the
marketing chain but rather involves the horizontal plane of
buyer and his or her immediate seller. May someone other
than the buyer stand in the buyer's shoes and sue the buyer's
immediate seller [or the remote manufacturer]? If "hori-
zontal privity" is required, only the buyer can sue.
Section 2-318 addresses the question of horizontal priv-
ity (i.e., who can sue) but not vertical privity (i.e., who can
be sued):
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.'
Comment 3, by expressing neutrality towards develop-
ing case law, invites judicial abolition of vertical privity.
1. Vertical privity
A consumer who purchases oral contraceptives from a
pharmacy which has bought from a pharmaceutical com-
pany is faced with a vertical privity problem if she brings a
'1 UCC § 2-318. In 1966, section 2-318 was amended in the Official Text and
three alternatives replaced the former 2-318. The 1962 version became alternative
A. Alternative A, the most widely enacted version of 2-318, permits a buyer or any
member of his or her family, household or a household guest to sue the seller for
personal injuries. Alternatives B and C permit any contemplated user to sue the
seller. Comment 3, by remaining neutral on case law development, invites exten-
sion of the class who can sue. Some courts have extended the class. E.g., McNally
v. Nicholson Mfg: Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler
Co.. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
[Vol. 15
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breach of Code warranty action against the pharmaceutical
company. She is attempting to move up the distribution
chain against a party with Whom she has not contracted.
Since 2-318 is neutral on vertical privity, the injured con-
sumer must consider developing case law.
States have dealt with vertical privity with varying re-
sults. A dichotomy exists based on whether the injury or the
form of action controls the nature of the suit. Illinois and
Texas are excellent illustrations. Neither requires privity in
strict tort liability actions. There the similarity ends. The
Illinois Supreme Court in Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.2" em-
phasized the similarity between tort and implied warranty
liability and extended the abolition of the privity require-
ment to implied warranty actions as well. When given a
similar opportunity to abrogate the vertical privity require-
ment, the Federal District Court of the Southern District of
Texas in Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.2" refrained,
stating that while the causes of action for strict tort liability
and Code warranties may co-exist and liability may be sus-
tained under either, the elements of an action should depend
on the legal theory on which the action rests and not on the
type of injury that underpins the cause of action.30
At times, statutory variations aid the courts in abolish-
ing vertical privity. Rhode Island added a sentence to 2-315:
As to foodstuffs or drinks sold for human consumption in sealed
containers, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose, and such warranty shall extend
from the seller and the manufacturer or packer of such goods to
the person or persons described in § 6A-2-318 of this chapter."
21 56 I1. 2d 548. 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
:287 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
The Texas Legislature ignored the Official Text's alternatives to 2-318 and
enacted a substitute:
This chapter does not provide whether ... the buyer ... may sue
a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the qual-
itv of the goods. These are left to the courts for their determination.
FEx. Bvs. & COMM. CODE § 2-318 (1968). While this statute differs from that in
Illinois, the dichotomy in results is not based on statutory distinctions but rather
on whether the court emphasizes the type of injury or the form of the action.
1 GENERAL1AWS op R.I. § 6A-2-315 (1969).
1976-771
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Relying on this provision, Rhode Island excepted foodstuffs
and drinks sold for human consumption in sealed containers
from the general vertical privity requirement.3 In Oresman
v. G.D. Searle & Co., :n the Federal District Court of Rhode
Island extended the exception to include unfit drugs. The
court reasoned that both are intended for human consump-
tion and both pose a special danger to purchasers if con-
sumed."
2. Horizontal privity
A consumer other than the purchaser may confront a
horizontal privity problem if she brings a breach of Code
warranty against the pharmacy or whoever else was the last
seller in the chain. Some horizontal privity problems are
dispelled by 2-318. For example, the "person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home" need not be concerned with horizontal privity "if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may. . . consume
. . . the goods." Thus horizontal privity has been abrogated
in situations where a family member of a house guest "bor-
rows" a supply of oral contraceptives prescribed to the pur-
chaser when the transaction takes place in the purchaser's
home. :"
Horizontal privity problems in oral contraceptive cases
have not found their way into the reporters. Coupling the
probability of "borrowing" a prescription drug (especially
1 Finocchiaro v. Ward Baking Co., 104 R.I. 5, 241 A.2d 619 (1968).
3 .321 F. Supp. 449 (D.R.I. 1971).
' The Oresman court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment(b), which placed foods and drugs in the same category (products in-
tended for "intimate bodily use" including everything intended for internal human
consumption, whether or not it has nutritional value) and Gottsdanker v. Cutter
Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960), a Salk vaccine case,
where the California court extended the waiver of the vertical privity requirement
from goods to include drugs.
: - Federal law prohibits dispensing oral contraceptives without prescription.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1972). Some pharmaceuti-
cal companies print this caution on their packaging of refills. E.g., Searle & Co.
(Ovulen-21) (Dem/ulen). Others do not. E.g., Parke-Davis Laboratories (Loestrin).
All are required to note on the accompanying flyer "Do Not Take This Drug With-
out Your Doctor's' Continued Supervision." 21 C.F.R. § 312.501 (1974).
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since a month's supply and not one pill must be borrowed)
with the probability against physical injury resulting from
the drug, the likelihood of an injured non-purchaser is re-
mote. Also, since 2-318 covers the normal situations where
borrowing might occur, the issue for all practical purposes
does not arise.
E. Breach of Warranty
What constitutes a breach of warranty? Section 2-314
(2)(c) provides that "Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as . . .are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used. . . ." For the pill to be merchantable,
must it do more than prevent conception? Must it also be
free from dangerous side effects? Some goods are unmer-
chantable because of the side effects :t they produce.
Even with side effects, oral contraceptives may be mer-
chantable under the theory that "If the product conforms to
the quality of other brands in the market, it will normally
be merchantable." 7 Since all oral contraceptives on the mar-
ket cause the same side effects, brands conform in quality.
With cancer-causing cigarettes having been held merchanta-
ble, stroke and heart attack-causing oral contraceptives
may be merchantable as well. If oral contraceptives are mer-
chantable, the injured consumer cannot claim breach of war-
ranty.
If there were an appellate opinion which affirmed a
judgment for an injured consumer, then the unmerchanta-
bility of oral contraceptives could be inferred. But none of
:" In Holowka v. York Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass'n, 2 UCC REP. SERV. 445
(Pa. C.P. 1963), Malathion, an insecticide, was purchased by a dairy farm to rid
its alfalfa of boll weevils. The alfalfa was then harvested and fed to cattle. The
residue left in the alfalfa killed some of the cattle. The court held that if the farmers
were able to prove that the Malathion residue did in fact kill their livestock, they
would be entitled to damages for breach of a Code warranty. "[Tihe use of mate-
rial which as a by-product causes death or injury to property is a classic example
of a breach of warranty that the material was safe to use." Id. at 448.
'7 ,J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
(IAIL CoIE 293 (1972).
:" Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 911 (1969) (pre-Code case; all cigarettes cause cancer).
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the cases affirm a judgment for the injured consumer. Some
side with the pharmaceutical company; :" others reverse and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings."' It is im-
possible to ascertain from the limited number of reported
cases whether the consumer has been able to demonstrate
that the pill was unmerchantable.
Not only must the injured consumer establish that the
oral contraceptives were unfit for the ordinary purposes for
which they were used, she also must establish that the
breach of warranty was the cause "in fact" and the "proxi-
mate cause" of her heart attack or stroke."
" Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1973)(statute of limita-
tions); accord, Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex.
1974)(pharmaceutical company's motion for summary judgment granted: no sale
of goods; no privity of contract).
40 Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Redfield
v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973); see Fischer v. Mead
Johnson Laboratories, 41 App. Div. 2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1973).
" ,1. WirlTE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIA. ('ODE 296 (1972). One causal problem relates to the statistical probability for
injury due to the pill. Women may suffer heart attacks and strokes whether or not
they use oral contraceptives. The pill only increases the rate at which these events
occur. Must the injured consumer establish that her stroke was not the one in eight
which still would have occurred had she not taken the pill? This issue has not
reached the reported decisions. It would seem, however, that the causal chain must
be established with more information than merely the higher incidences of heart
attack and stroke due to the pill.
Section 2-715(2)(b) states: "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include . . . (b) injury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty." Comment 5 to that section explains:
Where the injury involved follows the use of goods without discovery of
the defect causing the damage, the question of "proximate" cause turns
on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such
inspection as would have revealed the defects. If it was not reasonable for
him to do so, or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the
injury would not proximately result from the breach of warranty.
In the pill situation, the defect in the goods is known to the consumer. Since
instructions accompanying each month's supply of pills warns that the ingredients
in the pill may cause severe side effects, the question of whether it is reasonable
for the consumer to use the pills without inspection is irrelevant. But since the
consumer would discover the defect prior to use, is it accurate to say that the injury
would not proximately result from the breach of warranty? It must be remembered
that the pharmaceutical companies intend for the consumer to purchase and con-
sume the pills in their defective condition; otherwise they would not continue
marketing them. This is not a question of the manufacturer marketing goods that
it believes are marketable and the consumer discovering their unmarketability and
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Section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purposes for which the goods are required
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is . . an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Under the fitness warranty, does an oral contraceptive have
to do more than prevent conception? Planned Parenthood,
in Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.,42 suggested that since the
injured consumer did not allege that Enovid, the oral contra-
ceptive, did not prevent conception and since contraception
was the reason for which it was purchased, the consumer did
not allege a breach of warranty under the Code. The Illinois
Supreme Court responded that "[t]o accept this general
proposition based upon the present record would be palpably
contrary to the intent of the Code."' ' The implication is that
the pill must do more than prevent conception. It must not
carry with it the possibility of severe side effects.
Which warranty should be used? Some cases have been
brought on the merchantability warranty" and others on the
fitness warranty.5 Is there a difference between being fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used and
being fit for a particular purpose? With oral contraceptives,
the ordinary purpose and the particular purpose would be
the same."
using them anyway. It would only be unreasonable for a woman to consume the pills
if she knows that she has had blood clots and should not use oral contraceptives.
See also UCC § 2-314, Comment 13.
12 56 Il. 2d 548. 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
* Id. at 555.
* Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1974) (judg-
ment for the manufacturer reversed and case remanded for further appropriate
proceedings).
" Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
(pharmaceutical company's motion for summary judgment granted: cause of action
barred by the tort statute of limitations since article 2 was inapplicable-no sale-
and by no vertical privity with the pharmaceutical company); Oresman v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449 (D.R.I. 1971) (manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment for lack of vertical privity denied); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 II1. 2d
548. 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974) (judgment for the manufacturer based on the statute
of limitations was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings). In
Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1175 (D.R.I. 1975), the jury returned
verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and judgment was entered on the verdicts.
" Accord. UCC § 2-315, Comment 2.
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Caution must be exercised. The implied warranty for
fitness for a particular purpose may not apply to the phar-
macy. This warranty is inapplicable because the buyer is not
relying on the pharmacy-seller's skill or judgment. Rather,
she is relying on the skill and judgment of her physician, the
person who chooses the prescription. 7 The same logic may
be applicable to the pharmaceutical company as well. If
true, the injured consumer's cause of action is limited to the
implied warranty of merchantability.
F. Disclaimer
The implied warranties of merchantability (2-314) and
fitness for a particular purpose (2-315) expressly provide that
each may be disclaimed. Both can be disclaimed "by expres-
sions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty. . ... ,8 If such a term of ordinary com-
mercial usage is not used, the warranties can still be dis-
claimed but the disclaimer must meet certain requirements.
The disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability
must mention merchantability and must be conspicuous, if
in writing. The disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness
must be in writing and conspicuous, although it may be in
general language. 9
Each month's supply of oral contraceptives comes with
a small flyer giving directions for use and the following
warning:
The oral contraceptives are powerful and effective drugs
which can cause side effects in some users and should not be used
at all by some women. The most serious known side effect is
abnormal blood clotting which can be fatal.
Safe use of this drug requires a careful discussion with your
doctor. To assist him in providing you with the necessary infor-
17 UCC § 2-315, Comment 1; McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla.
1965)(MER/29).
11 UCC § 2-316 (3)(a).
1 UCC § 2-316(2). A warranty of fitness can be disclaimed by language such
as " 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof,' " Id.
[Vol. 15
THE PILL AND THE CODE
mation, (Firm Name) has prepared a booklet written in a style
understandable to the drug user. This provides information on
the effectiveness and known hazards of the drug including warn-
ings, side effects and who should not use it. Your doctor will give
you this booklet if you ask for it and he can answer any questions
you may have about the use of this drug.
Notify your doctor if you notice any unusual physical dis-
turbance or discomfort."'
There is no reference to "as is," "with all faults" or other
common commercial terms synonymous with disclaimer.
Nor is there a mention of merchantability. Also, there is no
general language attempting to disclaim the implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This statement is a
warning, not a disclaimer.
G. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk
Another remnant of the intertwined history of strict tort
liability and warranty liability is the carry over of the tort
concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
into warranty actions. Contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk are defenses to a warranty action in some courts
but not in others. "[Olne court's assumption of risk may be
another's contributory negligence and vice versa."'"
While the warning that accompanies each month's sup-
ply of pills is not a disclaimer, does it bar the injured con-
sumer's action? When she reads the warning and then pro-
ceeds to use the pills, knowing they can cause severe physical
injury and even death, has she assumed the risk or acted in
a manner that constitutes contributory negligence?
This issue may be framed in terms other than assump-
tion of risk or contributory negligence. The warning may
relate to merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
' This warning is prescribed by the Federal Food and Drug Adminstration and
accompanies all birth control pills. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1974).
5. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 336-37 (1972). Compare Hinderer v. Ryan, 7 Wash. App. 434, 499
P.2d 252 (1972), with Hensley v. Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 279,
520 P.2d 146 (1974), and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jackson Transp. Co., 126
Ga. App. 471 (1972).
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For example, in Lewis v. Baker" the consumer was injured
by the prescription drug MER/29 (triparanol). The court
held that: a drug, properly tested, labeled with appropriate
warnings, approved by the Food and Drug Administration,
and marketed properly under federal regulation, is, as a mat-
ter of law, a reasonably safe product. Accordingly, a person
claiming to have suffered adverse effects from using such a
drug, unless he can prove an impurity or an inadequacy in
labeling, may not recover against the seller for breach of
warranty. Under this rationale, since the Food and Drug
Administration requires each prescription to be labeled with
a warning, there is no Code warranty action available to the
injured consumer of oral contraceptives.
The reported cases have not discussed the warning issue
because the purchase and injury in these cases predated the
warning."' But even if the warning accompanies all oral con-
traceptive prescritions, it is not above challenge. First, the
current warning may not bar all actions for breach of war-
ranty. While referring to side effects, the warning discusses
only blood clotting. No express warning is made about heart
attacks or other side effects. The warning should be held
inapplicable to unenumerated side effects. Second, the
warning is impotent. While the warning itself is clear, phar-
maceutical companies discount the risk. 4 "Oral contracep-
tives, like all potent drugs, have some side effects. Fortu-
nately, serious side effects are relatively rare." Third, the
warning, unlike the warning accompanying cigarettes, does
not present the consumer with a meaningful choice. Ciga-
rettes are luxuries. The smoker can choose not to smoke.
Birth control pills are necessities. The user has no option.
" 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (1966); accord, Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., .307 A.2d 449. 457 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
1 The warning dates from 1970. For a discussion of the history of the warning,
see Liability of Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS L. J. 1526 (1972). In
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974), and Redfield v.
Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973), the injured consumers
alleged no warning, the facts predate 1970, and the courts discussed issues other
than the warning.
1 "Oral contraceptives, like all potent drugs, have some side effects. Fortu-
nately. serious side effects are relatively rare." What You Should Know About "the
Pill," supra note 1.
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The alternatives-abstention, unwanted pregnancy, abor-
tion, less effective methods of birth control, and permanent
birth control (vasectomy and tubal ligation)-are not viable.
Finally, public policy demands that oral contraceptives be
treated as an exception to the rule that a warning precludes
the injured consumer's cause of action. With the threat of
overpopulation, the practice of birth control is of national
interest. Since the benefits are national, the detriments
should be national. The loss should be spread among all
consumers, rather than fall upon the individual injured con-
sumer.
II. UNWANTED PREGNANCIES
Traditional family values have been reshaped in the last
twenty years.5 The deliberately childless family, the married
career woman, and the planned one-child family are acquir-
ing acceptablility. The unspoken realities of childbearing
and childraising and their impact on what a woman may
expect of life are now being aired and debated."' Sex is
openly discussed in classrooms and elsewhere. 7 Much of this
has been tied to the pill. With the pill has come a new sense
of freedom-for men as well as women. The pill has created
an expectation that the size of families and the timing of
pregnancies can be accurately controlled.
If the pill fails, the chance for recovery under the Code
warranties is nil. Pharmaceutical companies do not ex-
pressly warrant that oral contraceptives will be absolutely
effective. Rather, they say, "[The pills] are almost com-
pletely effective in preventing pregnancy. ' 51 Nor does the
B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
E . PECK. THE BABY TRAP (1971); S. RAUL, MOTHER'S DAY IS OVER (1973); A.
& A. SIILERMAN. THE CASE AGAINST HAVING CHILDREN (1971).
" Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970); Hopkins v.
Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Sup. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (1971); Medeiros v. Kiyo-
saki. 52 Hawaii 436. 478 P.2d 314 (1970); E. LIEBERMAN & E. PECK, SEX AND BIRTH
CONTHOi, A GUIDE FOR THE YOUNG (1973); D. REUBEN, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS
WVANTE) TO KNOW ABOUT SEX, BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK (1969).
What You Should Know about "the Pill," supra n.1; accord, Whittington v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971). Therefore, the manufacturers
make no 2-313 warranty.
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Code impliedly warrant that oral contraceptives will be 100%
effective. This statement finds support in Whittington v. Eli
Lilly & Co. ,5, where the Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of West Virginia rejected the pregnant plaintiff's
allegation that the pharmaceutical company's implied war-
ranty of fitness was absolute efficacy of the pill. The court
said:
The pill is an artificial agent designed to alter the reproduc-
tive processes that in the normal course of things, if left undis-
turbed, provides a means for the propagation of the species. In
the very nature of things it cannot be totally and absolutely effec-
tive. The undisturbed physiological processes of the female re-
productive system in nature do not reach absolute perfection in
their functions. And just as perfection is not achieved by nature
in these functions, so also it cannot be expected to be achieved
by artificial means.'
The booklet "What You Should Know About 'The
Pill,'" distributed by pharmaceutical companies to physi-
cians for their patients, contains disclaimer language: "[the
pills] are almost completely effective in preventing preg-
nancy." Although this statement may be "language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty. . .,"" it is suspect as a disclaimer since
it does not accompany each prescription. But even without
a disclaimer, the pill is merchantable and fit for its particu-
lar purpose, and the consumer has no cause of action for
breach of either implied warranty for an alleged failure to
prevent pregnancy.
III. DEFORMED OFFSPRING
Perhaps some justification can be found for denying a
warranty action to a consumer who takes the pill and suffers
physical injury. She knew or should have known that these
side effects were possible. Also some justification may be
'" 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971)(pharmaceutical company's motion for
summary judgment granted). See Barrett, Damages for Wrongful Birth, 21 CLEVE.
Sr. L. REv. 34 (1972).
Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98, 100-01 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
" UCC § 2-316(3)(a).
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found for denying a warranty action to a consumer who takes
the pill for contraceptive purposes and the pill fails to per-
form that function. She knew or should have known that the
pill was not perfect. When the injury is to children, however,
sympathies must lie with them.
One court has permitted deformed offspring to proceed
against a pharmaceutical company. In Jorgensen v. Mead
Johnson Laboratories, Inc., Ms. Jorgensen discontinued her
use of Oracon birth control pills and became pregnant. She
gave birth to Mongoloid twins. The twins brought an implied
warranty action against the pharmaceutical company, alleg-
ing that the pills altered the chromosome structure of their
mother so as to produce their Mongoloid deformity. Mead
Johnson, the defendant, moved to dismiss, alleging that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action in favor of the
minor plaintiffs. The Federal District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma sustained the motion. 2 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment of dismissal and re-
manded the cause for further proceedings. 3 The circuit court
held that the pleadings should not have been construed as
being limited to effects or developments before conception,
that the case should not have been viewed from the stand-
point of alleged effects on the mother, who was not suing, but
from that of the twins and the injury allegedly inflicted on
them. The court reasoned that the cause of action need not
await legislative action since, not only have the Oklahoma
courts recognized basic warranty principles, but the right to
sue for prenatal injury has generally evolved from court deci-
sion. The problem of the injuries is one of cause in fact and
proximate cause."
12 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
*' Burleson v. Mead Johnson & Co., 331 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Tex. 1971), a pre-
Code case, was a breach of warranty action brought by the mother of a deformed
offspring. The district court sustained the pharmaceutical company's motion to
dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. After
losing this round, the deformed offspring himself filed an action. Burleson v. Mead
.Johnson & Co., 463 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1972). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment for the pharmaceutical company. "The unequivocal
uncontroverted evidence of Mrs.Burleson's obstetrician, gynecologist, and attend-
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IV. CONCLUSION
An injured consumer will find her breach of Code war-
ranty action nearly impossible to maintain. Since she relied
on her physician and not the pharmacy or pharmaceutical
company, an action for breach of implied warranty (2-315)
may not be available."5 An action for breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability (2-314 (2)(c)) may be likewise
unavailable since a pill that conforms to the quality of other
brands on the market may be merchantable. If the pill is
unmerchantable, then the warning, although not a dis-
claimer, generally will bar recovery for prescription drugs.
Beyond that, the consumer must establish that the breach
of warranty was the cause in fact and the proximate cause
of her injury. Should she conquer these obstacles, she is still
barred from suit in those states requiring vertical privity of
contract because she has not dealt with the pharmaceutical
company.
The injured consumer has little control over such haz-
ards. Her only hope is that she will find herself in a jurisdic-
tion amenable to her position. Even here, the following pit-
falls must be avoided:
(1) She should not accept free samples from her physi-
cian. In such a case, Code warranties are inapplicable be-
cause the transaction is not a sale but a gift. Implied warran-
ties extend only to sales.
(2) She should not fill her prescription at the place
where it is prescribed. Because such a transaction will likely
be classified as a sale of services, and since implied warran-
ties extend only to sales of goods, Code warranties may be
inapplicable.
(3) She should not delay suit beyond the period speci-
fied in the shorter tort statute of limitations (i.e., generally
2 years from the time of injury). If she waits, she may find
ing pediatrician, together with the other evidence, ruled out Oracon as a cause of
the birth defects suffered by the plaintiff." Id. at 181.
" If the consumer buys from an agency that also prescribes the pill, the reli-
ance problem is replaced by the sales-service problem. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
56 Il. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974) (2-315 warranty).
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that the period has expired because her jurisdiction has held
the longer Code statute inapplicable.
(4) She should not delay giving notice of the breach,
since waiting beyond a reasonable time may bar the action.
(5) She should purchase her pills from a pharmacy
which has a broad financial base, and she should sue both
the pharmacy and the pharmaceutical company. The lack of
vertical privity which bars action against the pharmaceuti-
cal company would not bar it against the pharmacy.
Courts should be more receptive to the injured con-
sumer's claim. In balancing the interests of seller and con-
sumer, numerous factors support additional consumer pro-
tection. The product was put into the stream of commerce
by the pharmaceutical companies. Despite knowledge of de-
fects, they continue to promote their products. Mere addi-
tion of an ineffectual warning should not absolve the seller
of liability. Finally, since birth control is essential in dealing
with the population explosion-a problem national in
scope-the risk should be spread nationally, either among all
users of the pill or all users of pharmaceutical products.
Regardless of whether a woman has a cause of action for
breach of an implied warranty, stepped-up research is im-
perative. Can the pill be made safe? Are other methods, such
as the male pill, ultrasound treatments, or a reversible vasec-
tomy, viable alternatives?
The woman carries the brunt of the reproductive pro-
cess. She suffers the inconvenience and pain of carrying the
child, pain and possible death during childbirth, the onerous
burden of childraising, and the responsibility and side effects
of birth control. Furthermore, she is likely to be denied a
cause of action, at least under the implied Code warranties,
if injured by oral contraceptives. A more unbalanced scheme
would be difficult to find.
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